We characterize the excess demand function in the one-consumer model. We describe the relation between the direct and indirect utility functions, and we use it to derive a simple proof of the Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein theorem.
Introduction
In consumer theory, an individual demand function x (p, y) is defined as the solution to a simple optimization problem: it maximizes some utility function under a linear budget constraint. The properties that stem from this characterization have been known for more than one century. Under standard smoothness assumptions, individual demand functions are fully characterized by three properties: (i) homogeneity, (ii) Walras Law, and (iii) the Slutsky conditions. In addition, one can define the indirect utility and expenditure functions. Again, it has been known for a long time that a one-to-one relationship exists between demand, direct utility, indirect utility and expenditure functions. Knowing any of these function is sufficient to uniquely recover preferences, hence the other three.
The results summarized above belong by now to the most standard presentation of consumer theory. Equally standard is the fact that, for many applications (among which general equilibrium theory), it can be helpful to consider excess demand functions instead of Marshallian demands. For any Marshallian demand x (p, y), the excess demand z (p) is defined by z (p) = x (p, p 0 ω) − ω where ω denotes the agent's initial endowment. A very natural question is whether the standard results on Marshallian demands have a counterpart for excess demands. Specifically, can one find necessary and sufficient condition for some arbitrary function z (p) to be an individual excess demand? And does the oneto-one correspondence between the direct utility, indirect utility and demand functions extend to the excess demand framework?
Quite surprisingly, these very natural questions have not received an answer so far. While it is easy to derive necessary conditions on individual excess demand functions, their sufficiency has not been established, and the relationship between the direct utility, indirect utility and demand functions has not been investigated. Standard consumer theory thus exhibits a gap.
The goal of this paper is precisely to fill this gap. We first derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that fully characterize excess demand functions. Whenever a smooth function z (p) satisfies these conditions, then it is possible to find an initial endowment and a direct utility function for which z (p) is the excess demand. These conditions, somewhat unsurprisingly, are (i) homogeneity, (ii) Walras Law, and (iii) a variant of the Slutsky conditions; however, the proof of sufficiency (the so-called 'integrability' problem) cannot be transposed from the standard framework, and one has to find a different argument.
It turns out from our results that the one-to-one relationship between the direct utility, indirect utility and demand functions is lost in the excess demand context. For any excess demand function z (p) and any initial endowment, there exist a continuum of different direct utility functions from which z (p) can be derived. In a similar way, while it is always possible, starting from some direct utility function (and some initial endowment), to uniquely define the corresponding, indirect utility function, the converse is not true. To any indirect utility function can be associated a continuum of different excess demand functions z (p). Each of these satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for integrability, hence can be associated with a continuum of direct utility functions.
Finally, our results have direct consequences for several problems in consumer theory and aggregation. In the paper, we consider the well-known Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein theorem on aggregate excess demand. The question, here, is whether it is possible, for any arbitrary, smooth function Z (p) that satisfies homogeneity and the Walras Law, to find n individual excess demand functions z 1 (p) , ..., z n (p) such that Z (p) decomposes into the sum of the z i (p). Surprisingly, the existing results do not rely on a formal characterization of individual excess demand functions. Our characterization of individual excess demand yields a one-line proof of the theorem. Not only is this proof short, it also allows a precise characterization of the degrees of freedom one has in constructing the individual utilities: in fact, the indirect utilities V i can be chosen arbitrarily; the choice of the corresponding z i then is unique.
Our result gives a better understanding of the fundamental difference between the two versions (market demand versus excess demand) of Sonnenschein's problem. It also suggests that the characterization of individual excess demand is indeed a difficult problem; as a matter of fact, it constitutes the core difficulty in the Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein literature.
2 Individual excess demand
The necessary conditions
Consider a standard consumer model. There are n goods, and the consumer is characterized by his/her utility function U : R 
We shall say that a C k function U, with k ≥ 2, is standard if:
• the gradient D z U(z) is non-zero everywhere, and the restriction of the second derivative
⊥ is negative definite for every z; it follows that U is strictly quasi-concave.
• for every p ∈ R n ++ , problem (P) has a solution z (p) ∈ R n with p 0 z (p) = 0
If U is standard, it follows from the implicit function theorem that the excess demand function z(p) is well-defined and
Then U is defined fromŨ by
zero-homogeneous and satisfies the Walras Law:
and there is a Lagrange multiplier λ (p), which is C k−1 and homogeneous of degree (−1) on R n ++ , such that:
Define the indirect utility V (p), for p ∈ R n ++ , by
is zero-homogenous and quasi-convex. Note that V cannot be strictly quasi-convex because of homogenety (the level sets {V ≤ a} are cones). However, it can be proved that, if V is
⊥ is positive definite. Note that p 0 D p V (p) = 0, by the Euler identity, so p and D p V (p) are orthogonal vectors; if none of them vanishes, their span is truly two-dimensional.
The envelope theorem applied to (E) gives:
Differentiating with respect to p, one gets:
It follows that the restriction of
⊥ is symmetric, and that its restriction to
is negative definite for every p. Note that this condition is the exact equivalent, in the excess demand case, of Slutsky symmetry and negativeness for Marshallian demands. Also, ifp is such that z (p) = 0, then, by equation (3),
. Note that D p V is one-to-one. We have even better:
The converse inequality holds for the same reason, so U (z (p 1 )) = U (z (p 2 )). Since U is standard, the solution of problem (P) is unique, so z (p 1 ) must be equal to z (p 2 ), and p 1 , which is collinear to
We summarize these results:
is standard, the indirect utility function V : R n ++ −→ R and the excess demand function z : R n ++ −→ R n satisfy the following: 
Local integrability
We now consider the converse. Take some C 2 functions V (p) and z (p) satisfying the necessary conditions. Is it possible to find a standard utility function U such that z (p) solves (P) for all p , and V (p) is the corresponding, indirect utility ? This is the standard 'integration' problem in consumer theory, expressed in the case of excess demand. It divides into two subproblems: the local one, where V and z are considered in a suitably small neighbourhood of a given pointp, and the global one, where V and z are considered on all of R n . In this section, we address the local problem, and we show that the answer is positive, provided D p V (p) 6 = 0 and a nondegeneracy condition is met. The situation near a pointp where D p V (p) = 0 is mathematically quite interesting, but will not be investigated in this paper.
is positive definite. Then there is an open convex cone Γ containingp such that V is an indirect utility function on Γ. In fact, take any C k−1 function λ(p) > 0, homogeneous of degree (−1) on Γ, and define:
Then there is a quasi-concave function U (z), defined and C k−1 on a convex neighbourhood N of z (p), with the following properties:
⊥ is negative definite (2) For every p ∈ Γ, we have:
The proof will be given in the appendix. We have similar results for excess demand:
, defined on some neighbourhood ofp into R n such that z (p) 6 = 0 and D p z (p) has rank (n − 1). Assume that, on that neigbourhood, z is homogeneous of degree zero, and that the restriction of D p z to [p] ⊥ is symmetric, and that its restriction
⊥ is negative definite. Then there is an open convex cone Γ containingp such that z is an excess demand function on Γ. In fact, there is a quasi-concave function U (z), defined and C k on a convex neighbourhood N of z (p), with the following properties:
The proof will be given in the appendix. Several remarks are in order here. First, unlike the standard case of market demand, one has existence but not uniqueness. This follows from the fact that, while U is a function of n variables, V and z are functions of n − 1 variables only (one dimension being lost because of homogeneity): information is lost in going from U to V and z, and cannot be recovered, in sharp constrast with the Marshallian case. Specifically:
• for each excess demand function z (p), there exist a continuum of direct utility functions U for which z is the excess demand. The idea is that U is characterized only on the subset M ⊂ R n generated by z (p) when p varies in Ω ⊂ S n−1 , which is a submanifold of codimension 1 in R n . The function U and its derivatives are known only on M, and must be extended outside this set;obviously, this extension can be made in many different ways.
• perhaps more surprisingly, to any homogenous, strictly quasi-convex indirect utility V (p) can be associated a continuum of excess demand functions: just pick up some arbitrary, positive scalar func-
is an excess demand.
It should also be noted that the proof cannot follow the usual path, based on duality. The standard approach, as in Hurwicz and Ozawa [5] , relies on the expenditure function, which has no natural equivalent in the case of excess demand. Similarly, proofs based on indirect utilities (i.e., integration of Roy's identity) cannot be used here, precisely because the one-to-one correspondence between direct and indirect utilities does not hold in this context. Hence, although the statement of the result is quite similar to the Slutsky characterization of market demand, its proof relies on a completely different (and somewhat more difficult) approach.
Global integrability
We now address the global problem. Take a C 2 function V : R n ++ −→ R satisfying condition (a). We associate with it a function V * : R n ++ −→ R defined as follows:
The function V * : R n ++ −→ R∪ {−∞} is quasi-concave, positively homogeneous of degree 0, and its domain, domV * = {z | V * (z) > −∞} , is a convex set. The optimality condition in problem (P * ) is D p V (p) = µz,with µ < 0. Ifz = µD p V (p), for some µ < 0, thenp 0z = 0 by the Euler identity, and the minimum in problem (P * ) with z =z is attained at p =p.
Introduce the cone:
It follows from the above that C ⊂ domV * ; if z ∈ C, then z = µD p V (p) for some µ < 0 and p ∈ R n ++ , and V * (z) = V (p) . 
⊥ is positive definite. Given any compact subset K ⊂ R n ++ where D p V does not vanish, then V is an indirect utility function on K. In fact, take any C 1 function λ(p) > 0, homogeneous of degree (−1) on a neighbourhood of K, and define:
Then there is a quasi-concave function U (z), defined and C 2 on a convex open set Ω containing M , with the following properties:
(1) U is C 2 on a neighbourhood N of M, and for every z ∈ N , the restriction of
⊥ is negative definite (2) For every p ∈ K, the point z (p) is the unique solution of problem (P), so that:
The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem
Let Z(p) be a C ∞ map from some open cone Ω of R n + into R n , homogeneous of degree zero and satisfying the Walras law p 0 Z(p) = 0. The problem raised by Sonnenschein (see [?] ) is the following: for any k ≥ n, is it possible to find k excess demand functions z 1 (p), ..., z k (p), such that:
As it is well known, the answer to this question is positive (see [10] , [6] , [3] ). We provide a short proof. Note that we require that Z be C 2 , so that our result is more in the Mas-Colell line (see [7] ) Theorem 6 Assume Z(p) is a C 2 map defined on a compact subset K ⊂; R n ++ , homogeneous of degree zero and satisfying the Walras law p 0 Z(p) = 0. For any k ≥ n, we can find k excess demand functions z 1 (p), ..., z k (p), defined on K such that the decomposition (14) holds on K. The corresponding utility functions U 1 (z) , ..., U k (z) are quasiconcave, and each U i is C 2 and strictly quasi-concave in a neighbourhood of z i (K).
Proof. Normalize prices by imposing that p 0 p = 1, so that prices belong to R n ++ ∪ S n−1 . Since p 0 Z(p) = 0, we can think of Z(p) as a tangent vector to S n−1 at p; the space of all such vectors (the tangent space T p S n−1 to S n−1 at p) has dimension (n − 1). Pick k functions V 1 (p), ..., V k (p), of class C 3 , satisfying condition (a), and such that, at every p ∈ K, the convex hull of DV 1 (p) , ..., DV k (p) contains 0 in its interior; this is possible provided k ≥ n. Using a smooth partition of unity, we can then find C 2 functions µ 1 < 0, ..., µ k < 0 on K such that
. By Theorem 4, z i is an individual excess demand, and the corresponding utility function U i (z) satisfy conditions (1) and (2).
Comments
A few comments are in order at this stage. Note, first, that in general only (n − 1) functions are required to span the positive orthant of the (n − 1)-dimensional sphere S n−1 . It is only when Z(p) = 0 that n functions are required, a well-known fact. Secondly, an interesting byproduct of this proof is that it describes the degrees of freedom available in the choice of individual utility functions. Basically, indirect utilities can be picked up almost arbitrarily (the only constraint being that Z (p) belongs to their negative span). However, once they have been chosen, then only one set of λ i (p) is acceptable; in other words, among the continuum of individual excess demands that can be associated with V i , only one can be used. Then any of the direct utilities corresponding to the z i can be adopted.
Finally, this argument sheds some light on the differences between the two problems raised by Sonnenschein, i.e. aggregate excess demand versus aggregate market demand. In the market demand case, a given function X (p) must be decomposed as the sum of n individual Marshallian demands:
where x i (p) is the solution of
In particular, the envelope theorem gives
, where α i is the Lagrange multiplier. It follows that :
Again, X(p) must be a linear combination of n gradients. The difference, however, is that while the coefficients µ i could be freely chosen in the excess demand case, in the market demand context they have to satisfy the budget constraint, which implies that:
These additional restrictions considerably increase the difficulty of the problem, which now amounts to a system of nonlinear partial differential equations:
This system has been solved in [1] , in the case when the rigth-hand side X (p) is real analytic. The case when X (p) is smooth, C ∞ say, but not real analytic, remains open. It is also an open question whether solutions to (15a) can be found globally: the mathematical technique used in [1] constructs solutions in some neighbourhood of any given pointp.
A Proof of Theorem 3
A. 1 Step 1: Constructing U A .
Define z (p) from (4). It is C k−1 , and by the Euler identity, we have:
so that z satisfies the Walras law. In addition, z(p) is zero-homogeneous of degree zero, so that
and
Without loss of generality, assume that kpk = 1. It follows from equations (16) and (17) 
, and it follows from relation (3) that D p z (p) has rank (n − 1).Consider the map φ defined on S n−1 × R by φ(p, t) = t z(p). Then D p,t φ (p) has rank n,and it follows from the inverse function theorem that φ is a
In other words, we are prescribing the values of U and its first derivatives on M. There is a compatibility condition to be satisfied, namely that we get the same value for D p U(z(p)). This yields:
Substituting relations (17) and (4), we find an identity, so the compatibility condition holds. Now look at the problem in the (p, t)-coordinates, that is, consider the functionŨ = U • φ: we knowŨ (p, 1) = V (p) and the partial derivative ∂Ũ ∂t (p, 1) , and we want to defineŨ (p, t) in a neighbourhood of t = 1. This can be done in many ways, for instance by setting:Ũ
where
(p, 1). In particular, if we evaluate the situation atp, we find that the matrix of second derivatives takes the form:
... a n−1,n a n,1 ... a n,n−1 a nn (19) where the n terms a n,i = a i,n , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can be chosen freely. We now show that if A, and hence the a i,n , are appropriately chosen, the extension
A. 2 Step 2: U A is strictly quasi-concave
We are then left with the second term, which we compute:
and the last term on the right vanishes again if z 0 ξ = 0. So we are left with the following:
and the quadratic form on the right-hand side is negative definite on [Span {p, z (p)}] ⊥ , by condition (a). Since ξ ∈ T p S n−1 , we have (ξ, p) = 0, and so:
Rewrite the preceding result in terms of η :
A.3 Substep 2b: investigating D 2 zz U A (z) on the whole space
Note that the last term, which involves only first derivatives of U A , does not depend on the choice of A, provided it is evaluated at a point z ∈ M; this is because of the relations U A (z (p)) = V (p) and D z U(z(p)) = λ(p)p. Evaluating everything atz = φ (p, 1) , the above equation takes the form:
where M is a fixed operator and D
2Ũ
A (p, 1) is given by formula (19). We have shown, in the preceding substep, that the restriction of
⊥ is negative definite. This means that the restriction of D
A (p, 1)+M to E∩F is negative definite, where
From the definition of ϕ, it follows that E is simply the hyperplane t = 0. Going back to formula (19), we find that:
.. a n−1,n + m n−1,n a 1,n + m 1,n ... a n−1,n + m n−1,n a n,n + m n,n where the restriction of Q to F ∩E is negative definite. It is then easy to pick the a i,n so that the restriction of D 
⊥ , this means that U A is strictly quasi-concave..¥
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Introduce the differential one-form ω = X z i (p)dp i
Since the restriction of D p z to [z(p)] ⊥ is symmetric, we must have ω ∧ dω = 0. By the Darboux theorem (see [?] ), there are C k+1 functions µ(p) and V (p), defined in some neighbourhood ofp, such that ω = −µdV . By the convex Darboux theorem (see [4] and the references therein; the proof has to be adapted to the homogeneous case, which is straigthforward), we can take the functions µ and V to be homogeneous, with µ > 0 and D
⊥ . We can therefore apply theorem 3, taking λ(p) = 1/µ(p). We find a C k utility function U satisfying (a) and (b), the corresponding excess demand function being precisely z (p) .¥
C Proof of Theorem 5
Choose the function λ. By theorem 3, for every point z ∈ M there is a neighbourhood N z ⊂ C, the cone defined by (9) and a C 2 function U z : N z → R satisfying conditions (1) and (2) in that neighbourhood. Since M is compact, it can be covered by finitely many such neigbourhoods, say N 1 , ..., N m , associated with the functions U 1 , ..., U m . Take a smooth partition of unity associated with this covering, that is, m functions ϕ 1 , ...., ϕ m of class C 2 such that ϕ i ≥ 0, ϕ i (z) = 0 if z / ∈ U i , and P ϕ i = 1. Set U = P ϕ i U i ; the function U then is defined over ∪N i , which is a neighbourhood of M, and satisfies conditions (1) and (2) in that neighbourhood.
Looking at formula (9) , which defines the cone C, we find that M ⊂ C. If z ∈ M, then z = z (p) for some p, and U (z) = V (p) = V * (z).
On the other hand, if z ∈ ∪N i , but z / ∈ M, we must have U (z) < U (z (p)) = V (p) whenever p 0 z = 0, otherwise z would be the minimizer of problem (P). Since V * (z) ≤ V (p) whenever p 0 z = 0, it follows that
For the latter, note that since z ∈ ∪N i , the value U (z) is welldefined. Since z ∈ C, there exists some λ > 0 such that λz ∈ M, and since z / ∈ M, we must have λ 6 = 1. We have λz = z (p) for some p, and hence: V * (z) = V * (z (p)) for V * is 0-homogeneous
Since V * (z (p)) = V (p) , the conclusion follows.
We now extend U to a quasi-concave functionŪ , defined on a convex set containing N , and coinciding with U on N . This is an easy matter: for any number a, consider the set It is quasi-concave by construction. The Lemma implies that if z ∈ N and z ∈ co [Ω (a)], then z ∈ Ω (a), soŪ (z) = U (z) . This concludes the proof.¥
